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CRUMBLING OR TRANSFORMING? 




The Japanese economy, the second largest in the world for some two decades, has 
become a mature economy in the 1990s.1 Its growth performance in the first half of the 
1990s has been particularly poor; Japan is entering its fourth year of virtually zero growth, by 
far its worst economic performance in the past 50 years. This has been the consequence of 
the confluence of several major factors: inevitable cyclical slowdown following the business 
domestic investment boom of the late 1980s; the bursting in 1990-91 of speculative bubbles 
and the continued sharp declines in urban land and stock market prices; and the relatively 
sudden convergence of accumulated past pressures for economic structural adjustment, 
especially in simple, labor-intensive manufactures. The need for adjustment had been 
camouflaged by earlier oil crises and then by the domestic growth boom of the late 1980s. 
The recession has persisted, with little recovery, into summer 1995 at a huge cost in 
terms of output (GDP) forgone. This has been due in large part to disastrous macro 
mismanagement, especially of fiscal and exchange rate policies; the government bureaucracy 
continuously underestimated the problems of inadequate demand, and gave too high priority to 
central government budget balancing. Moreover, it did not take adequate import-enhancing 
measures or implement other policies designed to prevent continued yen appreciation, and the 
yen overvaluation in the speculative bubble of early 1995. For some years now Japan has 
pursued an unwise set of policies for a country building up foreign (and foreign currency 
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denominated) assets and becoming the world's largest creditor. The asset bubble was 
exacerbated by the collective belief, now shattered, that land prices would never decline 
deeply or for any sustained period. The bursting of the bubble has left huge amounts of bad 
or problematic loans financing speculative real estate projects that are not economically viable. 
This bad loan problem has created serious difficulties for the banking and the financial system 
more broadly, many still hidden and unresolved. 
At the same time, these economic difficulties have made highly visible, and even 
accelerated, more profound changes in Japan's economic structure and institutions. 
Agriculture — still politically significant and heavily subsidized by government expenditures, 
high prices to consumers for rice and other agricultural products, and severe import barriers — 
is of minor significance economically. Agriculture's share of GDP in 1992 was 2.1 percent 
and 8.5 percent of employment, and both shares continue to dwindle (OECD, 1994). That is 
nothing new; the agricultural sector has been declining steadily for decades. The share of 
manufacturing, the engine of rapid postwar growth, while a still high 26.8 percent of GDP has 
been decreasing. As in other countries, services of all kinds - business oriented and consumer 
oriented - continue to grow absolutely and as a share of GDP. Within manufacturing, Japan's 
loss of comparative advantage in labor-intensive production has accelerated, as productivity 
growth centering on very efficient export industries has steadily driven up the exchange rate. 
During the high growth era following Japan's postwar reconstruction — from the mid-
1950s to the mid-1970s ~ a number of important economic institutions developed, flourished 
and contributed to the rapid growth process. As the economy has continued to grow, albeit 
less rapidly, and evolve over the past two decades, the very growth process created conditions 
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that undermined those economic institutions, making them less effective and in some respects 
not only inefficient but counterproductive. This has been a gradual process, but the economic 
tribulations of the 1990s have put great pressure on many of these institutions, in some 
instances challenging their persistence and even very existence. Will they crumble and fall 
apart, or will they be transformed and continue to be effective, albeit in some new ways? 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the evolutionary change of 
three of the major postwar economic institutions: the large firm industrial relations system; 
the main bank system of large firm corporate finance; and the keiretsu systems of various 
forms of business ties among groups of firms. In following sections I consider the conditions 
and circumstances that resulted in the development and flourishing of these institutions; the 
subsequent developments of the economy that have made these institutions less effective and 
in some respects now clearly inefficient; how these institutions have responded; and, in a brief 
conclusion, speculate how they are likely to evolve. 
Put simply, over time Japan's economic success first supported, then undermined, 
these institutions. In my judgement, they will be transformed so as to continue to remain 
useful, not crumble away and disappear. While their formal structures - their architecture -
will persist, the specifics of their operation must, and will, change to reflect new economic 
realities. Descriptive studies and analyses of these three economic institutions abound, 
particularly in their postwar historical context, so I do not describe these institutions in detail. 
Rather, the objective is to provide a broad overview and, by implication, raise issues for 
further research. 
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I. The High Growth Era and the Flourishing of Economic Institutions 
From the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the mid-1970s, Japan was an economic 
follower in terms of GNP per capita and technology level relative to the world technology 
frontier. It was an extraordinarily successful follower, the first in Asia to absorb and utilize 
fully the industrial revolution which began in England, spread to the European continent and 
the United States, then to Japan and, more recently, to other Asian economies. 
Despite its prewar industrialization and early postwar reconstruction, Japan in the mid-
1950s was still a follower economy. Its GNP per capita was on the order of Malaysia's, 
though unlike Malaysia it was natural resource-poor and had a substantial industrial base. Its 
technological level and its capital stock per worker were quite far behind the United States. 
Importantly, Japan had tremendous human capital — many experienced managers and 
production engineers, and a work force trained to European levels of formal education. 
Japan's two decades of rapid economic growth - the high growth era - was not a 
miracle. It was a result of the synergistic interactions of available and improving human 
capital; rapidly growing business investment financed by equally rapid increases in savings 
and the private saving rate; huge (and highly profitable) importation of foreign technology; 
growth-oriented managers and entrepreneurs; supportive government policies; and favorable 
international economic environment. This sweeping characterization, while correct, makes it 
sound all too easy and straightforward. Large industrial enterprises, the engines of growth, 
had to overcome many obstacles. Labor-management relations initially were typically hostile 
and strikes frequent and bitter. Workers needed on-the-job training in order to utilize 
effectively the firm-specific requirements of new technologies being imported and adapted. 
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Constrained in their ability to raise capital and produce components internally, facing 
dramatically growing demand for their products, and seeking lower-cost labor and short-run 
cyclical buffers, large enterprises — especially in assembly industries ~ built stable supplier 
relationships with subcontractors. The growth opportunities for firms far exceeded their 
internal financing capabilities; they needed assured and stable mechanisms for long-term as 
well as short-term finance. Patrick and Rosovsky (1976) provide a contemporary overview of 
Japan's rapid growth performance in chapter 1, and subsequent chapters provide more detailed 
functional analyses. 
Economic and business information was in very short supply, and uncertainty about 
Japan's economic future high. Markets were imperfect. The domestic and international 
environment seemed risky. No one in the late 1950s expected the dynamic growth of the 
1960s. The Ikeda 1961 ten-year income doubling plan (implying an annual growth rate of 7.2 
percent) was initially viewed as too high; in reality the economy averaged more than 10 
percent annual growth. The nature and benefits of foreign technology were unclear, and the 
licensing costs at the time seemed high. It was difficult for lenders to evaluate the economic 
and business merits of new projects and business plans proposed by enterprises. Moreover 
corporate debt-equity ratios continued to be very high, far above prewar experience. 
The institutional developments of the high growth era were designed to reduce 
transactions costs, uncertainty and risk, to ensure stable supplies of labor and finance to large 
companies, and to enhance information flows and develop trustworthy, long-term relationships 
among firms doing business with each other. These institutions made possible a series of 
positive-sum games for the participants, from which all benefitted. 
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The most important component of the industrial relations system has been the so-called 
lifetime employment system, under which all regular workers — blue collar, clerical, and 
management-track ~ have essentially been guaranteed employment by the firm from initial 
hiring (typically immediately after completing school) until mandatory retirement between 
ages 55 and 60. In a rapidly growing economy this was a rational, efficient arrangement. 
High-quality new entrants were perceived to be in increasingly short supply. More 
importantly, with the presumption that the employee would remain with the firm for 30 to 35 
years, it was advantageous for both company and employee to invest in training to develop 
skills, in substantial part firm-specific. 2 Wage increases were based substantially upon 
length of service in the firm as well as position; in effect workers were paid below their 
marginal labor productivity earlier in their career, and reaped the rewards of having developed 
skills later in their career. Workers were promoted based on seniority. However, because the 
number of positions were always fewer as an employee moved up the firm's hierarchy, the 
selection process has always been highly competitive, based on performance (merit) rather 
than politics, nepotism, or other extraneous criteria used by planned economies, which also 
have had lifetime employment systems. Koike (1988) and Dore (1989) provide representative 
descriptions and analyses of Japan's industrial relations system. 
The final element in this tightly knit, synergistic industrial relations system was 
enterprise unionism in which the union is co-terminus with the firm. With permanent 
employment and the lack of labor mobility among large, high-wage firms, the long-run 
interests of workers and their union were tied to the success of the firm. Strikes hurt the 
company and benefitted competitors, and so were very costly for workers. On the other hand, 
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labor-saving technological innovations enhanced productivity and wages over the longer run, 
and any displaced workers were retrained and re-assigned, rather than being laid off, so were 
seen as a benefit rather than a threat. 
It is important to note that this industrial relations system applied primarily to large 
firms, and primarily to male employees. Japanese society, and hence the companies, expected 
women to marry and to have children, and in doing so to resign from the firm — which they 
did. While this system covered less than 30 percent of private sector workers, it did set the 
norms for behavior by medium-sized and small firms as well. 
The main bank system for large firm corporate finance developed in the early postwar 
period in response to the difficulties for potential lenders in obtaining good information about 
firms and their projects and in monitoring their performance and behavior. The government 
authorities regarded as premature the development of a capital market in which firms relied 
upon bond and stock issues as major sources of corporate external finance. Individual savers 
preferred holding time and savings deposits, in part because they had few alternative financial 
instruments to choose from, and in part because they were risk averse. 
The main bank takes responsibility for monitoring the borrower. It typically is the 
largest single lender, but for portfolio diversification reasons is unwilling to be the sole 
lender. Similarly, for oligopolistic bargaining reasons, the firm is reluctant to rely on a single 
lender. The main bank organizes a de facto syndicate of lenders to its client. Under 
circumstances of financial and business distress, the main bank takes the lead in bringing 
about a restructuring and incurs a disproportionate share of the losses that inevitably are a part 
of the restructuring. The main bank is compensated predominantly by preferential access to 
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the company's fee business (foreign exchange, custody arrangements, etc.) and to its 
transactions deposits, as well as employee and subsidiary company deposits. The main bank 
system is described and analyzed in considerable detail in Aoki and Patrick (1994); see 
particularly the overview chapter by Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard, and the individual chapters by 
each, as well as others participating in this World Bank-sponsored study. 
The third economic institution considered here is the keiretsu, or groups of affiliated 
business enterprises. This generic term has been used loosely, and at times misused. There 
are at least four types of keiretsu. Probably the best known are the so-called financial 
keiretsu, sometimes termed horizontal or inter-industry keiretsu. They are the Big Six, with a 
bank at the center (sometimes together with a trading company), and prewar zaibatsu ties: the 
rather close-knit Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo groups, and the somewhat looser Fuyo, 
Dai-ichi Kangyo, and Sanwa groups. Members of each group give preference to each other in 
business relationships, but since they are in different industries and the group comprises a 
small share of the total number of large-scale enterprises, the overwhelming proportion of 
their business as sellers and buyers is with non-group companies. Financial keiretsu 
facilitated information creation and exchange, reduced agency costs of reciprocal monitoring, 
reduced transactions costs and costs of financial distress and re-organization, and in the 1960s 
undertook joint entry into new industries where scale was significant or risks were high. 
Through extensive cross-shareholding, they effectively insulated self-perpetuating 
managements from shareholder control (Gerlach 1992). 
Probably more important economically have been the vertical keiretsu of supplier-
buyer arrangements and relationships in manufacturing, epitomized by auto assembly, with its 
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very large number of parts and components, and characteristic of other assembly industries as 
well, especially consumer electronics. Over time, supplier-buyer relationships were 
developed, based on repeat business and considerable trust, which made supplier investment in 
product-specific equipment and parts R&D innovations less risky and mutually beneficial, and 
the just-in-time production system possible. Toyota Motor Company is archetypical of 
vertical keiretsu, but such groups characterize all the Japanese car assemblers. Smitka (1991) 
and Asanuma (1989) provide descriptions and analyses of the benefits of this intermediate, 
independent but not arms length, rather tightly controlled form of vertical business 
organization, which has turned out to be superior in many instances to either vertical 
integration or arms-length spot markets. 
Distribution keiretsu are a third form. They refer to the distributions networks of 
consumer goods manufacturers with a wide range of related products. The manufacturer 
maintains a network of wholesalers and small, nominally independent retailers, who sell the 
company's products ~ in some instances only the company's products, in others giving it 
strong preference in shelf space and other marketing measures. Prototypical examples are 
Matsushita in consumer electronics and Shiseido in cosmetics. Toyota and other car 
manufacturers follow this practice in requiring automobile sole dealerships. 
A fourth category are enterprise keiretsu, less studied but nonetheless significant. 
Typically one industrial enterprise is at the core, and other affiliated firms surround it in 
related industries. Enterprise keiretsu are analogous to conglomerates of firms in related 
industries, but without the same degree of central ownership and control. One important 
purpose is to internalize to the group, economies external to any single firm. For example, 
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urban commuter railroad companies such as Tokyu have built department stores at the central 
terminal end of the line, housing or an amusement park at the other end, and developed land 
and housing along the line. Manufacturing firms such as Hitachi, Toshiba, or Nippon Steel 
are also at the core of their respective enterprise keiretsu. 
Japan's high growth economy was a producer, production-oriented system, into which 
these economic institutions had become firmly embedded by the mid-1960s. Yet, despite its 
biases in favor of producers over consumers and investors over savers, the system was 
beneficial for virtually every Japanese because all shared in the rapid growth the system 
generated. Real wages increased rapidly. The movement of labor from agriculture to 
manufacturing was dramatic; some 90 percent of the children of farmers went into non-farm 
jobs, leaving their gradually aging parents and grandparents to handle the farms. Recessions 
were brief; GNP did not actually decline, and the slowdowns in output growth were modest. 
The permanent employment compact meant that firms did not lay off temporarily redundant 
workers; in effect, unemployment social security was privatized in effect. Income was 
redistributed from high productivity growth sectors by means of wages and the labor market, 
and of government policies protecting farmers and small shopkeepers. The result was 
increases in relative prices with the costs borne by consumers. It was a system with many 
costs, but the costs were hidden or tolerated as seemingly inevitable byproducts of rapid 
growth. 
Moreover, Japanese business, governmental and professional elites were generally 
perceived as behaving with restraint in terms of their own material awards. Accordingly, 
potential social tensions were muted, and Marxist concepts of class and class conflict never 
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took hold. In part as a consequence of Occupation reforms and early postwar reforms, 
income distribution was and continued to be relatively equal — considerably more so than in 
the United States or Western Europe. Company president and senior management salaries 
were good but relatively modest. The central government bureaucracy was paid moderate 
salaries, below those in the private sector. Politicians have had access to a great deal of 
money but have used it mainly to finance the maintenance of their political machines, not to 
amass huge personal wealth. Japan's elite are not perceived as having Swiss bank accounts or 
other hidden caches of wealth, nor do they engage in blatantly opulent consumption. While 
there are some very rich people in Japan, they have not been perceived as having achieved it 
in particularly illicit, corrupt, or immoral ways. Most wealth accumulation has been the 
consequence of ownership of land and to a lesser extent of family-owned companies, as well 
as cumulated saving. 
II. Success Undermines Institutions Designed for a Different Era 
Successful economic growth inevitably brings about profound structural change and 
changes in the economic environment for business. This process is typically gradual and 
evolutionary, though it may be punctuated by sharp, discontinuous events. These systemic 
changes in Japan have come to undermine the rationale and effectiveness of important 
elements of Japan's industrial relations system, its main bank system, and the keiretsu 
systems. 
The mid-1970s mark a major turning point for Japan's economy. Japan achieved its 
century-long objective of "catching up with the West" in terms of civilian goods technology 
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level, GNP per capita, capital-labor ratios, and level of human skills. Then, however, rather 
than a gradual process of subsiding rates of growth, the economy quite abruptly shifted to a 4-
5 percent growth rate during 1975-1991, a sharp decline from the 9-10 percent rate of the 
high growth era. The first oil crisis-induced recession in 1974 was traumatic; business 
became less optimistic about future growth prospects, and the increase in business investment 
slowed dramatically until the investment boom of the late 1980s. For an excellent study of 
the period from the first oil crisis to the "great yen appreciation" beginning in 1985, see 
Lincoln (1988). 
One important systemic consequence was that Japan shifted from being a 
Schumpeterian economy, with ex ante private investment greater than ex ante private saving, 
to a Keynesian economy in which saving declined less rapidly and accordingly has been 
greater than investment. Japan has had a virtually textbook Keynesian economy of 
insufficient domestic private demand ever since 1974. The private saving surplus was 
absorbed domestically in the latter part of the 1970s by general government deficit spending, 
which rose to 6 percent of GNP. However, in 1981 decision-makers came to fear that 
continuation of deficits would be inflationary in the long run, and inaugurated a sustained and 
very successful effort to achieve a central government balanced budget. This resulted in a 
consolidated general government surplus of 3 percent — an amazing swing in government 
saving in thirteen years. (The government sector excess of saving over investment reached 
minus 6.3 percent of net national product [NNP] in 1978, then swung sharply in the mid 
1980s, to become a surplus in 1987, reaching 3.5 percent of NNP in 1991.) The depressing 
impact on domestic growth was offset, however, first by the export surplus emanating from 
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the undervalued yen (overvalued dollar) of the early to mid 1980s, and then by the business 
investment boom of the late 1980s. The negative effect of public sector surpluses has 
manifested itself only in the sustained recession of 1992-95, which was caused by inadequate 
domestic demand and vacillating and wrong-headed fiscal policy. 
The Keynesian economic condition of a surplus of saving over investment has had 
profound effects since the mid-1970s. Financial institutions had ample funds from saving 
deposits; with slower paced loan demand growth, interest rates were low and credit rationing 
became a thing of the past. Moreover, Japan increasingly exported its excess saving by 
running a current account surplus, burgeoning to a peak of 4.0 percent of GNP in 1986 before 
declining in the late 1980s boom to 0.7 percent in 1990, only to rise sharply to a peak of 3.4 
percent in 1992. 
Internationally the 1970s was also a turning point. Until 1971 or so the United States 
tended to make the "small country assumption" about Japan: its economic size was too small 
for its domestic economic policies to have a significant effect on the United States or on 
world markets. But Japan's economic success, its size, its growing share of world markets, its 
emerging current account surplus, and its undervalued yen combined to invalidate earlier 
assumptions. Japan was correctly perceived to be a "big country"; its domestic economic 
policies affected the U.S. and other economies. The U.S. became increasingly concerned 
about access to the hitherto protected, closed domestic market, for both imports and foreign 
direct investment. 
Not only had Japan become a big country with a big economy (second largest in the 
world), Japanese companies had become large, strong, and in several sectors major global 
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competitors. They could cope with the inevitable foreign pressures for Japan to liberalize 
trade, investment and portfolio capital flows; and in important sectors firms benefitted 
substantially from increased participation in the world economy. Their credit ratings rose 
accordingly. At the same time, in a slower growth environment large firms became more 
cautious and risk-averse; and some industries and firms did much better than others as 
comparative advantage evolved. 
An important systemic change was the ending of the government-based Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate system in 1973, replaced by a market-based system of flexible exchange 
rates among the major currencies (yen, dollar, deutsche mark). In terms of longer-run 
averages, exchange rates have responded to the fundamental economic forces of trade and 
current account flows, long-term capital flows, differential rates of inflation, and domestic 
macroeconomic policies. In the short-run exchange rate volatility has increased as a result of 
episodes of dollar or yen overvaluation, currency speculation, divergent macro policies, and 
market perceptions of the implications of movements in all the relevant short-run and long-run 
variables. Japan's experience in the past two decades is exceptional in at least three respects. 
First, Japan's cumulative current account surplus since the early 1980s has now made 
Japan by far the world's largest creditor nation. Second, Japan's productivity gains have 
occurred not simply in manufacturing, but particularly within export-oriented industries. As a 
consequence, the purchasing power parity for Japanese traded goods increased from 
approximately 300 yen to the dollar in 1971 (when the fixed exchange rate was 360 yen) to 
an estimated 110 yen in 1994 ~ while the purchasing power parity of non-traded goods and 
services was on the order of 200 yen. This productivity gap contributed to the yen 
14 
appreciation. Third, an extraordinary gap has emerged and persisted between high prices in 
Japan and world prices in tradable goods and services, notably in manufactures where tariff 
and other government barriers are low, as well as in agricultural products (not just rice) where 
high protection persists. These price discrepancies expose the constipated nature of Japan's 
distribution systems and supplier-buyer networks, which were designed to digest only 
established Japanese goods, not new goods and especially not those of foreign origin. These 
market blockages and distribution imperfections on the import side — more than government 
protectionist trade policies per se — have contributed in driving the yen to successive heights, 
exacerbated by the speculative yen-dollar bubble in spring 1995. At the same time, despite 
the ongoing recession, imports in the mid-1990s have been increasing dramatically, as 
extraordinary profit opportunities have generated new distribution channels and simplified or 
widened existing ones, and much lower import prices have attracted buyers. The recent 
absolute declines in prices of consumer manufactured goods as a consequence of an 
increasingly competitive environment have inaccurately been termed "price destruction" in 
Japan. It is more appropriately termed "price creation", as global market competition replaces 
manufacturer administrative power in price setting. 
Yen appreciation has had two major impacts. It has made clear the shift in Japan's 
comparative advantage (as discussed below), bringing about a continuing increase in the 
volume of manufacturer's imports, though less in value terms (and from a very low initial 
base), and an accelerating outflow of foreign direct investment in manufacturing to low labor 
cost countries, especially in Asia. And, since most Japanese foreign portfolio assets have 
been invested in dollar or other foreign currency financial claims, Japanese financial 
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institutions have taken huge foreign exchange losses, realized and unrealized, estimated to be 
on the order of $400 billion even prior to the early 1995 further appreciation. 
Other major changes in the Japanese economy have been more gradual in their 
development and in their impact on economic institutions. Although it might be argued that, 
during the early 1960s, Japan had actual or dynamic potential comparative advantage in 
virtually every manufacturing sector (relative to agriculture and many business services), by 
the 1970s Japan was beginning to lose competitiveness in all standard, labor-intensive 
manufacturing ~ first textiles, then consumer electronics, then simple auto parts, and on up 
the product ladder. However, evolving comparative advantage was obscured, and adjustment 
delayed, by the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1979-80, which worsened Japan's terms of trade, 
resulted in yen depreciation, and provided renewed impetus to export-oriented production. 
Adjustment was further delayed by the overvalued dollar of the early to mid 1980s and the 
domestic growth boom of the late 1980s. Only in the 1990s has the degree of 
uncompetitiveness in labor-intensive manufacturing been fully exposed. 
One of the most profound transformations in Japan, albeit gradual so that its 
implications have not yet been fully appreciated, has been the demographic transition of the 
past 100 years — with the past 50 years the fruition of earlier trends ~ from a high mortality, 
high fertility society to one of low death and very low birth rates, and great increases in life 
expectancy. Labor force growth, never rapid, has slowed dramatically and will soon turn 
negative. The absolute size of the working age population (15-64) peaks in 1996. The future 
is that of an aging society — higher proportions of the total population 65 and over, rising 
average age of the labor force, and a shortage of labor. In the intermediate run, two other 
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offsetting forces are also at work: average working hours will continue to decrease (though 
the 1990s recession probably overstates the decline as of 1994) and labor inefficiently used in 
relatively unproductive activities will be better utilized. Japan's labor force is highly educated 
and has obtained job-specific skills through on-the-job training. To the extent skills are firm 
or industry specific, however, major changes in industrial structure will cause some micro 
difficulties in labor force adjustment. 
III. How Have These Economic Institutions Responded? 
The combined effects of economic growth and transformation in the past two decades 
have tended to undermine the economic institutions that served Japan so well in the first two 
decades of postwar growth. In the mid-1990s, as Japan enters economic maturity the 
combination of the cumulative effects of structural change, four years of zero-growth 
recession, and unanticipated exchange rate appreciation have heightened perceptions that 
Japan's economic institutions are not only in difficulty but constitute an increasing drag on the 
economy. 
The Permanent Employment System 
A sufficient condition for the permanent employment system is that the demand for 
labor services by the great majority of firms rises steadily, and that decreases in the demand 
for labor be modest and brief. In other words, output growth is greater than productivity 
growth. The system becomes much less attractive and less beneficial when cyclical declines 
in company sales are steep and sustained, and especially when a firm (and industry) loses 
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competitiveness over the longer-run to the point that domestic production declines. Firms 
have always recognized this, and have developed a variety of safety valves over the past two 
decades to reduce labor inputs and costs as the firm's demand for labor services decreases. 
These include extensive overtime, under normal conditions, and use of contract workers, part-
time workers, and female workers (especially in assembly operations) since their turnover rate 
is relatively high. Attrition — not fully replacing regular workers who retire or otherwise 
leave the firm — is a basic but very slow method of adjustment, cyclically and in the longer 
run. 
But as the recession has persisted and increasing numbers of regular employees have 
become effectively redundant, none of these have been sufficient for many firms. Excess 
workers cannot be laid off and removed from a firm's payroll; that would break the implicit 
but strong permanent employment commitment. No individual firm can do that without 
severe loss of reputation; it would make the recruitment of new employees much more 
difficult, among other things. Because all large industrial firms in any given industry 
maintain the system, domestic competition among them is not substantially altered by 
maintaining the permanent employment system. However, the implications for international 
competitiveness are two-fold. First, in the shortrun, by regarding labor costs as fixed, firms 
have an incentive to reduce prices in export markets in order to maintain production. In 
aggregate this means the yen remains stronger than otherwise, which tends to accelerate the 
longer-run structural adjustment process. Second, the inability to reduce labor costs flexibly 
once all existing safety values have been utilized delays the process of internal cost cutting, 
restructuring, and downsizing by firms. 
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The fundamental problem ~ that most manufacturing firms now require fewer workers 
- is long standing. It really began in the mid-1970s as the economy's growth rate dropped 
by half. Firms began reducing their blue-collar labor force sooner and more effectively than 
either their clerical or management-track employees. Much of this has involved the 
substitution of part-time production workers, predominantly married women, for full-time 
employees. In 1980, for the economy as a whole, part-time workers comprised 10.1 percent 
of all employees and 7.2 percent of the labor force; by 1993 these numbers had increased 
substantially to 18.0 percent and 14.5 percent (OECD). Even so, large Japanese firms face 
two major employment problems. One is the excess supply of redundant 45 to 50 year old 
middle managers. The other is the excessive layering of white-collar workers, managerial and 
clerical, in what has become in many firms a rather bureaucratic, hierarchical, bloated system 
of management, with attendant high overhead costs and inefficiencies. 
The problem of too many middle managers in large firms has received a great deal of 
news coverage and public attention; after all, they are college graduates, just like the media 
people, scholars, businessmen, and bureaucrats who are concerned about them. Moreover, the 
permanent employment system is deeply embedded in Japan's management system. The 
current problem is the inevitable consequence of the slowness of firms some twenty years ago 
to reduce the number of new entrants into their management track as they began to grow less 
rapidly. Despite a great deal of rhetoric and hand-wringing, in fact very few middle managers 
have actually been laid off. Some have been bought off with early retirement packages. 
Others have been transferred to subsidiaries and affiliated firms, perhaps with higher-sounding 
titles but lower future wages. Some have been retained, but with a clear understanding not 
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only that they will not be promoted but that their wages will not rise. And some have been 
recruited by, or sent to, mid-sized or smaller family firms seeking professional managers. 
(This infusion of experienced talent may contribute significantly to increasing the managerial 
efficiency and productivity of those firms, and to the economy as well.) In general, firms 
have been solicitous of their managers' welfare, and have borne the costs involved. 
Accordingly, while the permanent employment commitment has been maintained in 
principle, actual practices have resulted in reductions of parent company managerial 
employees and wage costs. I do not expect the permanent employment system to break down. 
Rather, I interpret all the rhetoric as a way to alter the expectations about, and hence the 
conditions of, the implicit permanent employment contract. The message to newly recruited 
university graduates is: you are guaranteed employment until the firm's standard retirement 
age, but it will not necessarily be with the parent firm; there is a significant probability that, 
unless you perform very well, you will be transferred at age 45 or so to a subsidiary or 
affiliated firm with lower wages and less prestige. The message to current middle-aged 
managers is: we will not fire you (this is not America) but regrettably, for reasons beyond 
our control, your future prospects with us are less bright than we had anticipated, and you 
have to share with the company the burden of the costs of keeping you on. 
Adjustments have been taking place in other aspects of the industrial relations system 
as well. In reality, seniority wage increases have steadily become a smaller component since 
the mid-1970s, when the slope of the seniority wage curve achieved its steepest position. 
Merit has become a more significant element. No doubt this process will continue. Still, in 
my judgement the seniority promotion system is not significantly changed and will not be; 
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although juniors will not be promoted over seniors, promotion already has been based 
fundamentally on performance and merit. However, the pressure to reduce firm employment 
means the competition for promotion will become more severe. The enterprise union system 
will continue; it is useful to both management and workers. Nonetheless, the gradual decline 
in the private sector unionization rate, from 24.7 percent in 1980 to 21.3 percent in 1992 
reflects changes in industrial structure, employment patterns (more non-union, part-time 
workers), and a low rate of union formation in firms newly entering the larger scale ranks. 
The second challenge to the permanent employment system ~ reducing the layers of 
management and numbers of white-collar support staff in order to cut overhead costs and 
inefficiencies ~ is related to the problem of excessive hiring of management-track entrants 
years ago, but is distinct. Japan has an outstandingly efficient, lean production system and 
management of the production process, particularly in assembly industries. As in the United 
States, over time as firms grew they added layers of management beyond what, in retrospect, 
was efficient. Probably the ample (i.e., increasingly excess) supply of managerial talent at all 
levels within firms since the mid-1970s contributed. At any rate, overhead costs ballooned 
while production costs were being cut. Now firms realize they must re-engineer their white-
collar operations. The issues and difficulties are the same as with the excess supply of middle 
managers: how to get rid of white-collar workers without formal layoffs. 
There are three categories of positions to be eliminated. Managers are the most 
important and most expensive, and that is proceeding as described above. Reduction in the 
numbers of female clerical workers is much less of a problem since turnover continues to be 
high; normal attrition is a workable solution. Perhaps the most difficult group to reduce are 
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the predominantly male, non-management-track staff, permanently assigned to specific 
sections and serving as repositories of knowledge and expertise as management-track staff are 
rotated. Reductions are more difficult both because it may be less easy to transfer them to 
affiliated companies and because their specific expertise and historical knowledge are likely to 
be particularly valuable to the firm. Attrition, combined with early retirement buy-outs, 
appears to be the most likely solution. All this implies that compared to the U.S., re-
engineering will take much longer in Japanese companies and ongoing costs of adjustment 
will be higher. This is the downside of the permanent employment system. 
Some argue that the system will disintegrate, that firms will abandon making 
permanent employment commitments to newly hired employees. I think that unlikely. First, 
firms face a prisoner's dilemma; no single firm can abandon the system without loss of 
reputation and attendant difficulty in recruiting new workers, the great majority of whom are 
risk-averse and place a high premium on job security. While there may be institutional 
mechanisms such as Keidanren or Nikkeiren through which large industrial firms might jointly 
agree to terminate the permanent employment system, such an outcome seems unlikely. 
Second and more important, the sustained current recession with its extensive amount 
of labor redundancy masks the longer-run demographic reality of future labor shortages. 
Permanent employment as a firm-based institution deals with long-run shortages of qualified 
labor. Thus firms in the short-to-intermediate run will simultaneously be downsizing by 
attrition, early retirement, and transfer of employees, and competing vigorously in the new-
entrant labor market to hire fewer people but from an ever smaller cohort. And, as an 
increasing number of women enter the labor force with career or at least lifetime employment 
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aspirations, tight labor markets will result in greater opportunities for, and increasingly 
efficient use of, female workers ~ albeit from a quite low base in most white-collar 
occupations. 
While large-firm middle managers constitute the most publicized element in the need 
for employee adjustment, the more serious structural problem for the economy lies in labor-
intensive small and medium manufacturing enterprises being competed out of existence by 
imports and company decisions to invest and produce abroad in low-wage countries. These 
employees do not have implicit permanent employment contracts to nearly the same degree, 
and many will be laid off. They will have to find new jobs or leave the labor force 
(retirement, married women withdrawal). The "three-D" jobs (dull, dirty, dangerous) recently 
done by foreign workers, legal and illegal, are once again being filled by Japanese. Once this 
reservoir is depleted, the unemployment problem for Japanese will become more serious. In 
contrast to large firms, the smaller firm labor market is much more flexible; worker turnover 
is higher, firm-specific skills are less substantial, and wage rates are more competitive. As in 
past downswings, many of the newly unemployed manufacturing workers will probably be 
absorbed in a variety of personal service businesses ~ retail establishments, restaurants, and 
the like — and in small family-owned businesses. The question is: will labor market 
flexibility be sufficient to absorb what is likely to be several million workers, much greater 
than unemployment in the past? 
The best, and indeed the most effective, mechanism for labor re-allocation is steady, 
fairly rapid (3 percent plus) GNP growth. That will create the jobs into which workers in 
declining industries and sectors can be absorbed. The adjustment process will be eased by the 
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demographic reality of labor force contraction. Indeed, in the longer run, once the potential 
growth gap is closed and labor is no longer redundant, the employment problem will become 
reversed. Even slight declines in the labor force will then result in labor shortages, upward 
pressure on wages, substitution of capital for labor (machines for workers), and more efficient 
utilization, especially of female workers. In contrast, the near-term problem for the Japanese 
economy is how to generate sufficient new jobs to absorb those who inevitably will lose their 
jobs in uncompetitive manufacturing sectors. This transition process will be difficult, and 
perhaps will generate considerable rhetoric. My hunch is that the government will provide 
more programs of employment adjustment than in the past, and that the adjustment process 
will proceed more smoothly than many expect. 
The Main Bank System 
The main bank system provided loans to large industrial corporate clients at a time 
when information was scarce and poor, monitoring could be done more effectively by banks, 
and rapidly growing firms had huge needs for external finance. Japan's economic success and 
slower growth weakened the rationale for the main bank system as it had existed. Firms had 
become large, they had established track records, and information about them became much 
more available. In the more moderate growth era of the past two decades, as business 
investment opportunities became more modest and internally generated funds increased 
(particularly depreciation cash flow resulting from the ever-rising capital intensity of firms), 
firms needed smaller amounts of external funds. They were able to reduce substantially the 
debt to equity ratios that had been very high earlier. 
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Even more important was the gradual liberalization of financial markets and the 
financial system beginning in the late 1970s. The government had maintained controls on 
interest rates, creation of new financial instruments, and competition within and especially 
across different categories of banks and other financial institutions. Market pressures forced 
liberalization upon a reluctant Ministry of Finance. The fact that some firms came to hold 
surplus short-term funds on which they wanted a market return invigorated a gensaki 
short-term free market which ultimately forced, through competition, deposit rates to be 
liberalized ~ first large-scale CDS (the wholesale market) and, very gradually, smaller saving 
deposits and finally ordinary deposits (the retail market). The surge in government deficit 
financing not only dramatically increased the supply of government bonds, it led to a vibrant 
secondary market so that the basis for market-determined long-term interest rates was 
established. International pressure for Japan to liberalize finance, symbolized by the 1984 
Yen-Dollar Accord, was a further, albeit relatively minor, contribution to the financial 
liberalization process. Probably its most important consequence was the Ministry of Finance 
decision to allow Japanese companies to issue Euro-currency bonds, with Japanese institutions 
the underwriters (and major ultimate purchasers), on terms substantially more favorable than 
in Japan. 
The postwar development of a corporate bond market had been prevented by Ministry 
of Finance policy which was designed to ensure the leading roles of long-term credit banks 
and main banks in large firm corporate finance. Once firms became large and creditworthy, 
bond issue became a cheaper form of finance than bank loans. The Euro-bond market in 
particular became a major source of external finance for many companies, particularly in the 
25 
booming 1980s. The domestic market developed much more slowly, however, due to 
remaining restrictions; it was the first major case of financial Mhollowing-outM (or, more 
correctly, lagging development) due to regulation.3 Corporate bond issue and equity issue 
(often in the form of convertible bonds) were direct competition to main bank loans. 
Accordingly, the benefits of the main bank system were reduced and the costs 
increased. Companies needed less external funds, and increasingly they met those needs 
through the capital market. As firms became strong and information more readily available, 
in many instances monitoring became increasingly pro forma. Company-main bank 
relationships have not been terminated, but they have attenuated. Bilateral bargaining power 
has shifted from the main bank to the industrial corporation client. Preferential access to 
various form of fee business remains, but even those markets are becoming more competitive. 
The recent liberalization permitting interest payments on demand deposits reduces the 
attractiveness of access to corporate-related deposits. 
With surplus funds and reduced loan demand by prime clients, the large city, trust, and 
long-term credit banks in the 1980s sought new customers. Some went to international 
financial markets, becoming major international players. Others focused increasingly on the 
domestic mid-market of medium and smaller firms hitherto financed predominantly by 
regional and local banks. And, in the late 1980s all moved vigorously into new real estate 
projects, which seemed safe since they were collateralized by rapidly rising urban land prices 
in an economy in which land prices had never substantially declined at any time during the 
postwar period. This collective myopia, and the speculative land bubble it engendered, 
proved to be a colossal mistake. When the asset bubble burst, banks became stuck with 
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non-performing loans in a real estate market of sharply declining prices, increasing unrented 
urban commercial office space as new projects have been completed, and tremendous 
decreases in rents. These losses, most still unrealized, continue to plague bank performance. 
The deep decline in stock market prices, off more than 50 percent from their peak, has 
sharply reduced the unrealized capital gains on bank stock portfolios, hitherto a source not 
only of Tier 2 capital but of realizable profits to offset realized loan losses. The combination 
of bad loans and sharp decline in unrealized capital gains has seriously weakened the banking 
system. 
The seven major main banks — Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sakura, Dai-ichi Kangyo, Fuji, 
Sanwa and the Industrial Bank of Japan ~ have all suffered large losses, but well within their 
capacity to handle. Indeed, once the financial system gradually works off its loan losses, 
these banks will emerge relatively stronger than ever. However, will they continue to serve as 
main banks? Haven't they lost their best industrial clients to capital market financing? And 
will they shed other main bank relationships where the borrower is perceived as weak, and 
hence, as having little future? 
Despite affirmative answers to the last two questions, they do not mean the main bank 
system will evaporate. Rather, it will become more complex. With strong firms not 
borrowing much from banks, traditional relationships will be much looser but will not 
disappear. Some firms within the main bank group have relied more on bank loans than 
capital market funding, and their bank relationships will persist. However, the relationship is 
likely to become attenuated over time as the firm reaches the point at which it can rely more 
on capital market financing. The banks will continually have to find new firms with which to 
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establish main bank relationships, where their monitoring capabilities are beneficial to the 
borrower as well as the bank. Main banking is particularly useful for smaller, growing firms 
preparing to enter the stock market through initial public offerings (IPOs). Having a bank as 
existing stockholder and financier improves the terms of the offer for the issuing company; 
the main bank signals to the market its positive evaluation and support. In other words, the 
main bank function will persist, but for a new group of growing, smaller companies as its 
earlier clients graduate to the bond market. Its new main bank clients benefit not only from 
the reputation of having the backing of a prestigious main bank but from the bank's broader 
and deeper experience with a range of economic conditions and operational issues, and its 
range of financial services, in addition to its loans. For example, smaller firms have issued 
Euro-currency bonds, something possible only because they are guaranteed by a bank. This 
benefits both the company, which obtains access to lower cost funds, and the bank, which 
earns fees and retains funds for other uses. 
The Various Forms of Keiretsu 
Traditional keiretsu forms of buyer-supplier relationships have come under pressure 
from four major sources. These are rising labor costs; decisions of manufacturing firms, 
especially in assembly industries, to produce abroad; increasing competition in domestic 
markets from new sources, domestic and foreign; and the search for new technological 
partners. The effects of these pressure vary, not only from firm to firm, but by type of 
keiretsu. 
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Distribution keiretsu have been under pressure both from rising labor costs and 
increasing competition, especially in consumer non-durables. For many products, sole-
distributorship retail stores, often "Mom and Pop" operations, are too small to be efficient. 
Competition from discount stores (e.g., electronic consumer goods), department stores (e.g., 
cosmetics), and new forms of sales outlets makes it more difficult to sustain the price 
umbrellas inherent in sole distributor systems. To this is added the rapidly increasing volume 
of price-competitive imports made highly profitable by yen appreciation. Japan is in the 
midst of a distribution revolution in which traditional, established patterns are being 
undermined, and distribution channels widened. Distribution keiretsu will erode but will not 
disappear entirely. Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most visible, sole-dealership 
distribution keiretsu which persist are in auto dealerships; they are marginally eroding due 
mainly to U.S. pressure rather than market forces. 
Probably the greatest market pressure is on the vertical keiretsu. Components and 
parts produced in Japan by labor-intensive methods are no longer price competitive, despite 
vigorous efforts by subcontracting suppliers as well as final assemblers to reduce costs. These 
vertical relationships are no longer economically efficient. Yet precisely because they are 
long-term and built upon mutual trust, they are difficult to terminate. They often embody 
sociological (non-economic) elements which solidify such relationships. Moreover, an 
assembler precipitously terminating supplier relationships suffers reputation losses. 
Pressures on domestic vertical supplier-buyer relationships have been exacerbated by 
assembler decisions to shift production to foreign sites. This has proceeded farthest in 
consumer electronics, which have moved to low labor cost Asian economies. While auto 
29 
assemblers moved to North America and Western Europe mainly for market penetration 
reasons, subsequent yen appreciation has made production there less costly, especially in the 
United States, than in Japan. It is not that the vertical keiretsu will disappear; rather they are 
being transferred abroad and internationalized. A more complex sourcing strategy is 
emerging. Design-intensive, high-tech, high value added components will continue to be 
produced in Japan, and exported to overseas assemblers (both Japanese and local). First tier 
Japanese producers of medium-tech components will be encouraged to establish subsidiaries 
abroad, in order to benefit from lower labor costs and proximity to overseas assembly plants. 
And simple, standard labor-intensive parts and components will be produced abroad by local 
firms, both for local assembly plants and increasingly for export to operations in Japan. Thus, 
the internationalized vertical keiretsu will include both overseas subsidiaries of Japanese firms 
and local firms with which assemblers have established stable, long-term supplier 
relationships. All this will take time, however, in order to phase down or out established 
vertical relationships in Japan. 
The relationships among the Big Six financial keiretsu members are gradually 
loosening. As each firm has become very large it has become increasingly autonomous. 
Some members are issuing bonds rather than relying predominantly on their keiretsu main 
bank for loan finance. Member firms now seldom set up joint ventures with each other to 
enter new lines of business. Rather, alliances are increasingly dictated by needs to access 
complementary and synergistic technologies, which are usually held by firms in related fields 
that are not members of the same keiretsu. In chemicals, defensive strategies have generated 
alliances among members of different keiretsu. These pressures certainly do not mean that 
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the financial keiretsu will disappear. Some benefits of membership will persist, even as others 
are reduced. The hand of history is always strong. Moreover, the costs of membership in 
these quite exclusive "clubs" apparently are low - though costs, like benefits, are far from 
transparent, which makes it difficult to assess their impact on the economy. 
Enterprise keiretsu face the same pressures and challenges as the Big Six keiretsu. To 
the extent, however, that they are based on internalization to the group economies external to 
the individual firm, they will persist. Suppose a particular firm member is in an industry that 
has lost competitiveness, is making losses, and has poor prospects? How long will other 
members keep it alive, and at what cost? The quite rapid disappearance of Japan's keiretsu-
dominated aluminum industry, when the first oil crisis made it fundamentally uncompetitive 
suggests adjustment can occur relatively quickly. 
IV. Conclusion 
Japan's postwar economy has gone through four phases: reconstruction (1945 - mid-
1950s), high growth (mid-1950s - 1974), good growth (1974 - 1991), maturity (1992 on). In 
the high growth era a number of economic institutions developed and flourished in response 
to the needs for worker skill formation through on-the-job training, large amounts of company 
external finance to pay for their immense plant and equipment investment, and development 
of long-term business relationships where information was limited and spot markets were 
imperfect. 
However, many institutions particularly suitable for and supportive of rapid growth 
were of lesser benefit as Japan caught up with the West, became an economic and 
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technological leader rather than follower, achieved high levels of income, technology, and 
capital, and as growth moderated. Moreover, Japan rather dramatically shifted in the 1970s to 
a virtually textbook example of an economy in which private saving outstripped private 
domestic investment, surplus saving was lent and invested abroad, and Japan accumulated, 
like the United Kingdom and the United States earlier, a huge creditor position with the rest 
of the world. Gradually, Japan has become a mature economy, with a high standard of living, 
an aging labor force, and long-run growth rate prospects little different from the United States 
or the European Union. 
Many features of the earlier economic institutions are counterproductive and inefficient 
for a mature economy. This paper has examined three major economic institutional 
innovations of the rapid growth era, their current status, and their future prospects. The 
central finding is that the architecture, the basic structure, of these institutions persists and will 
continue to do so, even as major components and elements erode and are altered in response 
to changing economic realities. 
The overall structure of the large firm industrial relations system of permanent 
employment, seniority wages and promotions, and enterprise unionism will persist. However, 
permanent employment is no longer a guarantee of a position until retirement at the parent 
company; many workers, especially managerial-track, henceforth have to expect mid-career 
transfer to subsidiaries or affiliated companies. This is a profound change. Its implications 
are unclear. Competition among employees to remain with the parent company will be more 
severe. Some will respond with greater work effort and demonstrations of loyalty to the firm; 
others, particularly those willing to take more risk (and presumably the more able), will have 
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less-close ties to their employer, and are more likely to be open to other job opportunities. 
Firms not only will continue the seniority component in wages, they will seek ways to 
reduce the regular worker component (those to whom permanent employment is guaranteed) 
in their labor force. More contract and more part-time workers will be used. Some in-house 
overhead activities (advertising, legal services, etc.) will gradually be shifted to outside 
suppliers. Production and its management may be transferred to other firms on an OEM 
basis. For example, it is estimated that some 40 percent of Toyota's domestic car assembly is 
done under contract with Daihatsu, Hino, and other marginal assemblers. This suggests that, 
rather than going bankrupt or being merged into stronger firms, large but only marginally 
competitive firms have been and will continue to stay alive by paying lower wages and lower 
dividends. 
The benefits of the main bank system have dissipated for large, successful industrial 
corporations with strong balance sheets. They do not need the main bank monitoring services, 
and can obtain lower-cost capital through issuance of bonds, equities, and commercial paper. 
This does not mean that main bank relationships are terminated; rather, they become much 
looser and less intense, and bilateral bargaining power shifts from the bank to the firm. 
Having effectively lost an important part of its client base, main banks are seeking new clients 
for which their monitoring capabilities are still valuable, and which appear sufficiently 
attractive for the main bank to take on the responsibility for rescue and restructuring in the 
event of adversity. The mid-sized firm market is the obvious target, especially firms 
preparing to go public. A main bank confers superior reputation as well as the full range of 
financial services, and hence is able to attract such clients from their traditional, smaller bank 
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financiers. 
The term keiretsu is broad in scope and meaning. Certainly traditional long-term 
business relationships and ties are loosening as economic circumstances change. The keiretsu 
systems will not disappear, but it is unclear how much they will change, and in what way. 
Much is industry specific. Distribution keiretsu may persist as a substantial market-entry 
restricting device in a few industries such as automobiles. The Big Six financial (or 
horizontal) keiretsu will continue in form but intra-group business dealings, never large in 
manufacturing but significant in insurance and other financial services, will continue to 
decline relatively. Many group members have outgrown the group. For example, Mitsubishi 
Corporation, the trading company, has deals with Honda in the Philippines and Isuzu in 
Thailand as well as Mitsubishi Motors in Malaysia. The search for new technologies and 
technology synergies brings about new, non-keiretsu, alliances. Vertical keiretsu ~ long-term 
buyer-supplier relationship, particularly strong in assembly industries — will continue as a 
dominant form of economic organization, but they will shed some traditional, labor-intensive, 
low technology domestic suppliers, and will become international in scope, incorporating 
suppliers (both Japanese owned and indigenous) in other countries. 
In the longer run, say a decade hence, the Japanese economy will be significantly 
different. The trend growth rate will be on the order of 2.5 to 3.0 percent, probably about the 
same as the United States. The manufacturing share of GDP, now relatively large, will 
decrease and will be more narrowly focussed into relatively high tech, skilled-labor and 
capital-intensive industries. Agriculture, already a small source of GDP and even 
employment, will decline further. The share of business, professional and consumer-oriented 
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services will increase. Japan's import pattern will change dramatically. It will become a 
major importer of labor-intensive consumer goods and a huge market, just as the United 
States has been, though not of the same size. Much of Japan's manufactured goods imports 
will come from China and Southeast Asia, and sourcing from overseas subsidiaries of 
Japanese firms invested and producing abroad will be significant. 
Japan's economic institutions will not crumble away; they will be transformed. This is 
the typical evolutionary path of an economy's institutional heritage as the economy and the 
business environment change. History matters ~ or in the current jargon, path dependency is 
important. 
My thanks to Larry Meissner, James Morley and Margaret Pasquale for their comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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END NOTES 
1. By "mature economy" I mean an economy with large amounts of human and physical capital, and 
a high level of technology; the economy is (more or less) on the global production frontier of best 
known practices. Its future growth rate is constrained, a la long-run equilibrium growth models, to 
the rate of technological change, labor force growth, and (in some models), the rate of substitution of 
capital for labor. A mature economy does not have to decline; it can grow forever. In this context, a 
declining 
economy is one which, once having reached the world production frontier, has then fallen away from 
it; it has lost the capacity to create and absorb technology as well as before. 
2. In the chaotic early postwar period, workers placed high priority upon job security and this 
became a high priority for their unions. Moreover, large firms have continuously paid higher wages 
than small and medium-sized firms. Since large firms in principle hired only new entrants, a worker 
leaving a large firm could obtain only a lower-wage position in a smaller firm. The large wage 
differential by firm size was initially due to capital and labor market imperfections; over time it 
became a mechanism whereby firms were able to select the "best" entrants into the labor market, at 
all levels (blue collar, clerical, and management track). 
3. "Hollowing out" is an ambiguous term. In my view, the fact that Japanese labor-intensive 
manufacturing firms shift production to low labor cost countries is not hollowing out; it represents the 
economically efficient response to the loss of competitiveness (comparative advantage) whereby 
resources are shifted to higher value added domestic production. "Hollowing out" more appropriately 
refers to the relocation of activities abroad in response to poor government policies, whether domestic 
regulatory restrictions (as in the case of financial services) or a sustained period of currency 
overvaluation as a consequence of macroeconomic policies. 
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